טיעון
שלי בנושא בוררות מסחרית בינ״ל הכולל התייחסות לנושאים רבים הקשורים לאמנה ולחוק:
2.1
The legal framework
Article 16 of the IAA[1]
adopts
the Model law[2] (with
exceptions) and Article 1 defines
its scope of application as
follows:
"This Law applies to international commercial2
arbitration...
(3) An arbitration is international if:
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at
the time of the conclusion of that agreement, their places of business in
different States;.."
In our circumstances we are dealing
with a commercial dispute in Sydney between companies from different countries
and therefore the IAA applies.
"separability"
and "competence"
Article 16 of the Model Law
establishes the principles of "competence" and
"separability" (respectively) as follows:
"The arbitral tribunal may rule on its
own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or
validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration
clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement
independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral
tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the
invalidity of the arbitration clause".
Therefore, the arbitrator has the authority to determine whether
the arbitration agreement applies, and in separate from the validity of the
contract itself.
Choice of law
J Allsop recently[3]
referred to the choice of law (based on Australian case law) with regard to the
validity of the arbitration agreement, in the following words:
"The now embedded notion of separability
…makes unreliable any assumption that the law governing the substantive
contract will always be the law to govern the agreement to arbitrate. The
choice may be different and deliberate – express or implied. … If no
precisely directed choice be made by the parties (expressly or impliedly),
the available approaches …If one gives proper weight to the underlying and
fundamental notion of separability, the law of the seat can be seen to be a
more appropriate approach than the law of the substantive contract. ..This approach seems to have broad support. "
But in our case, it seems not so relevant - no argument was raised
against the arbitration agreement, and in Rinehart[4] the
court referred to similar scenario in the following words:
"388
Thus, to the extent that there can be said to be any separate attack on the
arbitration agreements, such attack is limited to the asserted misleading of
Ms Rinehart and Mr Hancock by not telling them that the arbitration process
would be private and would have to be paid for... All the other
factual complaints are directed to the substantive deeds and are not separately
directed to the arbitration clauses."
For the same reason, our arbitrator should reject the argument.
2.2 Independence and impartiality
Article 12 of the Model law, sets out the grounds for challenge, as
follows:
(1)...appointment as an arbitrator, he shall
disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as
to his impartiality or independence. .. and throughout the arbitral
proceedings, shall without delay disclose any such circumstances ..
(2) An arbitrator may be
challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as
to his impartiality or independence,..
However, s18A of the IAA provides that:
"For the purposes of Article
12(1) of the Model Law, there are justifiable doubts as to the impartiality or
independence of a person approached in connection with a possible appointment
as arbitrator only if there is a real danger of bias on the part of that
person in conducting the arbitration."
It is important to note that at least when it comes to the
disqualifications of judges, the Australian courts abandoned the English[5] test
and applied the “reasonable apprehension test", yet many believe that in
most cases this has no practical consequences[6]. Accordingly,
the interpretation of the term for the purposes of s18A is not entirely clear
in the Australian case law (especially in the event that the parties have
agreed otherwise).
The UNCITRAL
Rules
Article 12 and 11 of the UNCITRAL rules adopted here by the
parties apply the justifiable doubts on
the arbitrator similar to the Modal Law. However, the IAA - which is
non-dispositive- prevails in case of contradiction[7] (in
accordance with the lex arbitri on this
matter).
The IBA Guidelines[8]
The IBA Guidelines constitute (inter alia) an indicative list of
cases and norms of impartiality and independence of arbitrators.
The Red List indicates non-waivable and waivable (by the parties -
positively) situations of impartiality and independence, the Orange List
indicates waivable (positively or not) situations in which the arbitrator obligated
to disclose, and the Green List indicates situations in which there is no
appearance of independence or conflict of interest.
The Guidelines are widely accepted by the courts[9], though
they do not bind the partis) that did not choose them (. The Guidelines meant to harmonize norms in
order to prevent, for example, a situation in which arbitral awards will not be
enforced in other countries. The rationale behind the broad adoption of the
rules is, inter alia, that a "reasonable person" will expect to act
accordingly. And yet, not long-ago an English court [10]
decided not to disqualify an arbitrator that, according to the rules, was
supposed to resign.
The duty to render an enforceable award
It is important[11] that
the arbitrator (or court) decide on his or her disqualification (or duty of
disclosure), taking into account the outcome of his decision as to the
possibility of enforcing the award in countries that impose other norms (as the
Model Law and the Convention[12] (as
and if adopted) provide "public policy" exaptation).
For example, a court in Hong Kong recently refused to enforce an
award due to "apprehension of apparent bias" despite the fact that
the arbitrator has already been unsuccessfully challenged in an English court.
The court ruled that the fact that the matter was discussed in England is a
“very strong policy consideration” and yet the award still cannot be enforced
in Hong Kong.
The obligation to disclose even when there are no grounds for
disqualification
For the above reasons[13], it
is not difficult to understand why there is an obligation to disclose even when
the arbitrator believes that there is no cause for disqualification. This was
also recently ruled by the Court of Appeal in England[14], and
in the Bingham case.
Holding of shares of a party
The IBA Guidelines
Three scenarios from the IBA list are relevant:
Red non waivable - 1.3 "The arbitrator has a significant financial or personal
interest in one of the parties, or the outcome of the case"
Orange- 3.5.1 "The arbitrator holds
shares ..constitute a material holding in one of the
parties, ..this party or affiliate being publicly listed".
Green- 4.4.2
"The arbitrator holds an insignificant amount of shares in one of the
parties, . which is publicly listed."
Australian law
With regard to the disqualifications of a judge, it was held[15] that
only when the outcome of the litigation would result in a change in the value
of the shares held by the judge should he disqualify himself. In Clenae Pty V ANZ [16]it
was held that the judge had no financial interest in the outcome of the
litigation, and the judgment was not annulled even though the judge did not
reveal that he held (significantly) shares in ANZ, and because the Bank's paid
share capital was 1,539,440,677$. There was minority opinion tough that believed
that there was no independence of the judge. The judgment also mentioned
other countries approaches in (e.g., New Zealand), according to which
the judge must disqualify himself if it is not a negligible holding (regardless
of the financial interest test).
From the general to the specific
In our case it is quite clear that the holding is not negligible,
but on the other hand it is a public company, so it is not certain that there
is a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (probably not).
The seat is in Sydney but, as noted, the arbitrator should also
consider the countries in which the award could be enforced (Singapore and
maybe New Zealand). In New Zealand, if the holding is more than de- minimis,
it is enough to bring to disqualifications, and in Singapore, the criterion in
the IAA corresponding law is different[17].
According to the IBA rules, since the shares are of a public
company, then apparently there is no financial interest and its waivable.
Therefore, it is best for the arbitrator to disclose the fact that
he is a shareholder and to ask the parties to approve him positively to
continue in his position (unless he has a material financial interest).
2.3
The above regarding the arbitrator authorization and the choice of
law (in the absence of an explicit choice) are also true in this matter.
Article 14 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation
(2018) was not yet been adopted in Australia (or in New Zealand and Singapore)
but this does not mean that courts or arbitrators do not need to enforce such
tiered dispute resolution clauses.
The problem with the contractual clause is that the term
"negotiations in good faith" is abstract. However, in United v
Rail[18]
the Court referred to a previous judgment in England, in the following words:
"I reject the notion that such a contract is unknown to the law ...
in some circumstance a promise to negotiate in good faith will be
enforceable, depending upon its precise terms.... "
Accordingly, in Hooper[19]
the court found that arbitration should be stayed as there was a clear clause
and a suitable procedure for the negotiations pre -arbitration. In Aiton[20] it
was emphasized that in order to enforce similar stipulations, there should be
clear agreement that this is a preliminary stage before arbitration /
litigation.
In our circumstances, we have binding contractual stipulations
("must"), a clear procedure (senior representatives[21]) and
a duration (7 days), and therefore this procedure must be met. The arbitrator
must stay the proceedings and refer the parties to negotiations.
It is important to note that insofar as the parties wish the
arbitrator to participate in the negotiations, he must obtain their written
consent after the negotiating process has been exhausted as long as they wish
him to continue to serve as an arbitrator[22].
2.4
All of the above regarding the appropriate law and the
considerations guiding the arbitrator are also true here. The relevant examples
from the IBA guidance are (in the waivable red list):
2.3.8 The arbitrator has a close family relationship with one of
the parties, or with a manager, director ... 2.3.9 A close family member
has a significant financial or personal interest in one of the
parties"
The matter here is clearer and more related to the independence
of the arbitrator, and therefore the arbitrator is required to disclose and
obtain the consent of the parties.
It should be noted that the arbitrator also has a general and
contractual obligation to complete his job, and therefore, and from the
above considerations, if the parties agree, he must continue.
Liability and immunity in the absence of consent
Article 16 to the UNCITRAL Rules (which the parties adopted)
provides that: “Save for intentional wrongdoing, the parties waive,
to the fullest extent permitted under the applicable law, any claim against
the arbitrators, ..”
In accordance with the above, the applicable law is probably the
law of the seat (lex arbitri[23]).
Section 28 to the IAA provides that:" (1) an arbitrator is
not liable for anything done or omitted to be done by the arbitrator in good
faith in his or her capacity as arbitrator" (and it should
also be noted that S 25 to the Singaporean IAA provides that: "An
arbitrator shall not be liable for negligence .; New Zealand courts have granted even greater immunity[24]).
Hence, the arbitrator must reveal the connection to his son. If he resigns against their will, he may be liable[25], as
this (resignation) is not done in his capacity as arbitrator and without
justification.
On the other hand, if the arbitrator resigns due to the parties'
refusal to continue his appointment, there are two scenarios:
A.
If
the non-discloser of the relationship was done in good faith (which is unlikely
in view of the closeness to his son) - he is not liable to the parties and will
be immune.
B.
On
the other hand, if he knew - he might be liable, since the concealment during
his capacity was done in bad faith.
Naturally, there are not many precedents in case law, but in the past,
there was such case[26] (in
Australia) in which an arbitrator was obliged to compensate the parties for
non-disclosure (yet, under a former act[27]
-narrower).
4.
Section 7(2) of the IAA[28]
requires the court, at the request of a party, to order a stay of proceedings
or part of them, inasmuch as it "involves the determination of a matter
that, in pursuance of the agreement, is capable of settlement by arbitration".
In addition S7(4) provides: "For the purposes
of subsections (2) and (3), a reference to a party includes a reference to a
person claiming through or under a party."
The term "Arbitration
agreement" is defined as:
"an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or
certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. ..
(2) The arbitration agreement
shall be in writing.
(3) An arbitration agreement is
in writing if its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the
arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by
other means."
In our case s7(1)(d) also applies (as Bernard’s Ovens and Mr.
Bernard are domiciled in or are an ordinary resident of France- a Convention
country).
The main questions to be discussed first are whether there is an
"arbitration agreement" and who the parties are:
The applicable law with regard to the arbitration agreement
Absence of a specific express provision (see discussion above) –
lex fori. This was also recently held in the Jasmin[29]case,
specifically on the question of "partyhood".
In our case, the agreement "concluded" orally
(acceptance), and was written down. As quoted above, there is no need to sign
and according to Australian contract law the agreement is valid if it meets the
"certainty" requirement. In our case there is agreement to arbitrate,
on the seat and the institution (ACICA) so it seems that the minimal requirement
been met. This was also held in a recent US case.[30]
The parties to the agreement
It is not obligatory that the names of the parties be mentioned in
the arbitration agreement (only the content) and therefore it has already been
held that unsigned parties may be parties to an arbitration agreement in
accordance with the definition in the convention[31].
It can be assumed that Mr. Pompidou's intention was to contract on
behalf of the company (an assumption that an organ acts for the company) and it
appears that this was also Mr. Angelo's intention (as Baguette Ovens was sued).
Therefore, it is Baguette Ovens that can appeal to the Court by
virtue of Art 7 above (or Art 8 to the Model law) with a request to stay proceedings
and / or to refer to arbitration.
Nevertheless, there are a number of legal doctrines according to
which Mr. Bernard can claim that he is also a party to the arbitration
agreement and request the same:
Corporate ties and piercing the corporate veil
As stated, the Director is a separate legal entity, and no
allegations have been made of misuse of the corporate veil. Yet, in certain
cases, the courts have tended to allow the shareholder or a related company to enforce
an arbitration clause, especially in cases of a strong "relationship"
with the subsidiary or same agreement. In Australia, in IMC v Altain[32],
similar claim was rejected by the court - it was held that a related company
was not conducted as an alter ego of the signatory party. Nevertheless, in our
case the company is probably small (also bears the name of the owner) and Mr.
Pompidou was also involved in the negotiations, so he may have a stronger link
and better case.
Agent (and perhaps implicit consent)
According to this doctrine, it is possible under certain
circumstances to view the agent (of a signatory party) as a party to the
arbitration agreement, and the justification is "commercial
convenience" or "implicit consent". In Australia, in the Cosco case[33],
the Court rejected similar argument, but perhaps due to a weaker link and in
the absent of agency relations. In another judgment, doubts were expressed
regarding this doctrine as: "those interests of commercial convenience
may not necessarily extend to treating the principal as a “party” for the
purposes of s 7(2)". However, abroad[34],
this doctrine was used when the claiming party was the defendant.
Equitable estoppel
According to this doctrine in the event that business relationships
are held between several connected parties and one party filing few intertwined
claims it is estoped from preventing an unsigned
party from participating in the arbitration[35].
In conclusion
There are a number of doctrines which were adopted by both courts
and arbitration institutions[36] and
may allow Mr. Pompidou to argue that he is a party to the arbitration agreement
(s7 (4) seems irrelevant). Although in Australia they are not widely
acceptable, our circumstances are quite significant - owner of a small company
that conducted the negotiations himself and finds himself sued for the same set
of facts. Moreover, in our case, the language of the arbitration agreement does
not limit[37]
(and in fact almost does not exist), and therefore a more important weight is
given to the intentions of the parties.
The court's authority to stay the proceeding for non-party
In Natuzzi[38], it
was held that the court should stay the proceedings even if the IAA does not
apply[39], in
order to prevent conflicting decisions and from efficiency considerations, and provided
that not only that the claims are linked, but that the principal claim is the
claim being settled in the arbitration. In our case it seems that the claim
against the manager depends on the outcome of the claim for breach of contract.
Whether the claims are a "matter that, in pursuance of the
agreement, is capable of settlement by arbitration"
This question can be separated into two questions – the first is
whether the claims fall within the scope of the "arbitration
agreement" and the second is whether claim on statutory grounds can be
settled in arbitration?
Regarding the first question, it may be argued that since the
matter of the arbitration agreement arose only in the context of a delay in the
arrival of the ovens, the arbitration agreement refers only to a dispute on
this issue.
In Rinehart
v Welker[40]
the court referred to general interpretation as follows:
"When
the parties to a commercial contract agree…to refer to arbitration any dispute
or difference arising out of the agreement, their agreement should not be
construed narrowly.. They
are unlikely to have intended that different disputes should be resolved
before different tribunals,."
Based on this rationale, it was also held that statutory grounds
claims (arising from the agreement) should also be settled in the framework of
arbitration proceedings (depending on the relevant cause). Specifically, there
are many judgments[41] that
referred misleading conduct cases under the TPA (and under part IVA[42]) to
arbitration.
As mentioned, in our circumstances there is no detailed agreement
and in addition the claims against the company manager are related to the
specific transaction that is the subject of the arbitration agreement. Therefore,
it is unlikely that the intention was to exclude them from the arbitration
agreement.
5
Section 8 to the IAA instructing enforcement of "foreign
award" which "means an arbitral award made, in pursuance of an
"arbitration agreement", in a country other than Australia. The
term "arbitration agreement" is reviewed above and in our case the
other party domiciled in Boston, USA which is a Convention country and s
7(1)(d) applies (although Australia did not reserve). The arbitration award was
made outside of Australia (New York).
However, Subsection 3A lists a number of exceptions which, if met,
the court may refuse to enforce the ruling - the relevant ones are listed
below:
(b) the arbitration
agreement is not valid under the law
expressed in the agreement to be applicable to it or, where no law ..under the
law of the country where the award was
made;
The arbitration award was made in New York and it is also
reasonable to assume that if a law was specified it is the US law. In the US,
there is no impediment to signing an arbitration agreement relating to labor
relations (and in Australia[43]) and there are many judgments[44] on the subject (whether domestic or in relation to the New York
Convention). It is also important to note that this is a senior " international
"position.
(c)
that party was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator
or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
or her case in the arbitration proceedings;
In our case Ms. Jones did not receive the
arbitration notice and therefore the court must refuse to enforce. Indeed, in
the Uganda[45] case the Australian court noted (obiter)
that it would enforce the arbitrator's award even if the party changed address (and
did not receive the invitation) but this was only because it was held that the
Ugandan law applies to the arbitration agreement and "Section 8(1) of
the UAA provides that any written communication for the purposes of the UAA is deemed
to have been received if it is delivered to the addressee’s place of
business or mailing address".
It is also important to note New York courts[46] held that an actual summons must be
received:
"
under New York law that arbitration procedures comport
with due process of law by providing a party with notice and an opportunity to
be heard"
And in more similar circumstances, the
Swedish Supreme Court[47] ruled in relation to the Convention:
"it
is not acceptable that an arbitral award is recognised
and enforced against a party that has not been informed of the arbitration
proceeding or was even been able to know that it is in progress. When it comes
to the notification in question, a general requirement that it shall have
reached the counterparty should therefore be maintained."
(d) the award deals
with a difference not contemplated by, or not falling within the terms of, the
submission to arbitration, or contains a decision on a matter beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration; or
On this subject, see the discussion of
the question above (the ovens) - the claims stem from labor relations and incidental,
and therefore there is no reason for their exclusion.
(e) the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or
New York law determines[48] that in the absence of explicit consent,
the court will appoint the arbitrator. So apparently this requirement
was not met.
(7) …
(a) the subject matter .. is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the laws in force in the State or
Territory in which the court is
sitting; or
(b) to enforce the award would be contrary to public policy.
In our circumstances, the
award does not deal with employment rights, and there is no impediment to
enforce it almost anywhere.
[1]The
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (‘IAA’)
[2] United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration ("Model law")
[3]
James Allsop, The Role of Law in International Commercial Arbitration
(October 2018) CIArb Inaugural Annual Lecture < www.fedcourt.gov.au/__data/assets/rtf_file/0011/53102/Allsp-CJ-20181015.rtf>
[4] Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Rinehart [2017] FCAFC 170
[5]
R v Gough. In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex p
Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [2000] 1 AC
[6] Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451, 477
[7]See Desbois v. Industries A.C. Davie Inc.,
1990 CanLII 3619 (Canada- Que. C.A.)
[8] on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration 2014 (“IBA Guidelines”)
[9] See Sierra Fishing Company and others v Farran [2015] EWHC 140 (Comm) [2015] and Cofely Limited v Anthony Bingham [2016] EWHC 240 (Bingham case)
[10] W Ltd. v. M SDN BHD [2016] EWHC 422 (Comm)
[11] See foe example Art 41 of Rules of Arbitration of the ICC (2012).
[12] the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards adopted in 1958 by the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration
[13] See also IBA Guidelines, Part I(3)
[14] Halliburton Company v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 817
[15] See Dovade Pty Ltd & Ors v Westpac & Anor (04 May 2001) - [2001] HCAT and Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63
[16] In Clenae Pty Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd. 205 CLR 337; 75 ALJR 277; 176 ALR 644
[17] The "justifiable doubts" test in the IAA see Yee Hong Pte Ltd v. Powen Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd [2005] 3 SLR 512.
[18] United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 177 (3 July 2009)
[19] Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd v Natcon Group Pty Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 194
[20]
Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 996
[21] As in the "united case"
[22] Ku-ring-gai Council v Ichor Constructions Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 610
[23] See also Tadas Varapnickas, ‘The Law Applicable to Arbitrators’ Civil Liability from a European Point of View’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, March 25 2019, http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/03/25/the-law-applicable-to-arbitrators-civil-liability-from-a-european-point-of-view/
[24] Pickens v Templeton [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 718
[25] See Pieter Sanders, The work of UNCITRAL on arbitration and conciliation, 2004, p. 96 and see for example s 25 of the United Kingdom Arbitration Act 1996
[26] Vale v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Yusuf de Toit and
Mandie, unreported, Full Court, Supreme Court of Western Australia, FUL 72 of 1993
[27] the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA).
[28] or to refer the parties to arbitration in accordance to Article 8
of the Model Law
[29] Jasmin Solar Pty Ltd v Trina Solar Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1453; Trina Solar (US), Inc v Jasmin Solar Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 6
[30] Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 456 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 2018)
[31] See
[32] IMC Aviation Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC - [2011] VSCA 248
[33]
See jasmin
[34] See in the US: "Grand Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 748 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2014), Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1121-22 (3d Cir., Arnold v. Arnold Corp.-Printed Commc'ns For Bus., 920 F.2d 1269, 1281-82 (6th Cir. 1990).
[35] Port Cargo Service, LLC and Michoud Blvd. Commerce Center, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, et al., Case No. 18-6192, 2018 Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 1993) Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco International, Inc., 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008)
[36] ICC Case No. 7155 and ICC Case No. 11160.
[37] See Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc., 2017 WL 192690
[38] Casceli v Natuzzi S.p.A. [2012] FCA 691 ("Casceli v Natuzzi")
[39] under s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act and in light of s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act.
[40] Rinehart v Welker [2012] NSWCA 95 at [117]
[41] Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 157 FCR WesTrac Pty Ltd v Eastcoast OTR Tyres Pty Ltd. [2008] NSWSC 894 See however
[42] Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 5) (1998) 90 FCR 1, 20,
[43]
Metrocall Inc v Electronic Tracking Systems P/L, (2000) 52 NSWLR 1
[44] Khan v. Parsons Global Services, Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 2d 327 (D.D.C. 2007) Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, No. 15-16881 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 2017)
[45] Uganda Telecom Limited v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 131
[46]Yonir
Technologies, Inc. v. DURATION SYSTEMS (1992) LTD., 244 F. Supp. 2d 195
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) Matter of Beckman v. Greentree Securities, Inc., 87 N.Y.2d
566, 570, 640 N.Y.S.2d 845, 663 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1996)
[47] Arne Larsson & Partner Leasing Aktiebolag / Ö 13-09 at<https://www.arbitration.sccinstitute.com/views/pages/getfile.ashx?portalId=89&docId=1023107&propId=1578>
[48] Both the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §1, et seq.) and New York's CPLR (Article 75) - 7504